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Mirrors of change: 
industrialists 
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This study examines institutional changes in Chile and Uruguay 
between the mid-1960s and late 1990s. It seeks to tie together the 
macro and micro levels in order to observe how institutions working with 
local and global issues interact or conflict from the perspective of two 
industrialists’ associations, the Manufacturers Association (SFF) in Chile 
and the Chamber of Industry of Uruguay (CIU). From this vantage point, 
the study analyses how the organizations’ ‘logic of appropriateness’ has 
altered since the 1960s, with the expectation of identifying changes 
in the way sources of legitimacy interact at the global, regional and 
national levels. To make the process of change more visible, the study 
concentrates on two years, 1966 and 1998. It also tries to identify new 
dimensions of comparison between the development processes of Chile 
and Uruguay.
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Since the 1990s, an increasing body of work has been 
produced by institutionalists who regard rational choice 
as too narrow a perspective for explaining conflicts 
of interest in society (Hart, 1995). One aspect of this 
approach derives from organizational theory in the 
social sciences, among whose starting points is the 
work of Selznick (1949). Selznick maintained that 
organizations were not “rational creatures” but vehicles 
for values, and argued that organizational values and 
standards were transmitted through the institutional 
environment in which they were embedded. From this 
perspective, an organization is defined as the function 
of the legitimated interests transmitted through the 
‘institutional environment’. This environment is 
characterized by the creation of institutional rules and 
requirements to which organizations must conform 
if they are to be legitimated. An institution is seen 
as a ‘social pattern’ governed by particular rules of 
thought and behaviour, and the institutionalization of 
an organization takes place when it sets out to validate 
itself by imitating other models deemed superior 
(Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). This is of a piece with 
what March and Olsen (1989) called the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’, according to which it is possible to 
enforce rules without direct coercion, by imposing 
codes of behaviour.
Following this line of thinking, we shall look at 
industry associations as an institutional meeting point 
where the interaction of three institutional levels, the 
national, the regional and the global, can be observed. 
The boundaries between these levels are not fixed, so 
labelling organizations or institutions as belonging to 
one of them does not mean they cannot also act on the 
others. This study argues that there has been a change 
in the national institutional environment since the 
Second World War. The influence of world and regional 
institutions has increased during this period, a process 
that can clearly be identified in the globalization of the 
1990s. Some refer to this as Empire (Hardt and Negri, 
2000); we prefer to speak of the spread of a ‘world 
culture’ promoting standardized values and models. 
These have as their core a ‘technical’ (rational) outlook 
and a culture of human rights (Boli and Georg, 1999) 
promoted by a number of international bodies, centring 
on the United Nations system. Regionalism has been 
part of this process, but has taken place at a meso 
level, as a way of confronting globalization (Hettne and 
Inotai, 1997). All this has increasingly eroded nation-
States, the result being that new sources of ‘legitimacy’ 
have emerged from non-national ‘spheres of authority’ 
(Rosenau, 2003).
A second hypothesis is that structural changes 
have different effects at the local level, since each 
institutional environment creates its own forms of 
‘institutional isomorphism’ (mimetism) or resistance. 
Both Chile and Uruguay display their own forms 
of adaptation, each having its peculiar local mix of 
continuity and change. Like any comparison, of course, 
this one will have different nuances depending on the 
questions, variables and actors chosen. In any event, 
the hope is that the conclusions of this study will 
add to our understanding of institutional change and 
continuity, both between the countries and between 
micro- and macro-level institutions. It is also hoped 
that the approach of this study will reveal other 
factors that can serve to explain the different paths 
taken by development in Chile and Uruguay. For 
decades, the two countries were South America’s most 
stable democracies, with a strongly developed State 
machinery and vigorous industrial sector growth. In the 
1990s, once again under democratic rule, Chile pulled 
well ahead of Uruguay as a ‘successful’ model of ‘how 
things should be done’ in a globalized world.
Following the present introductory section, this 
study undertakes a brief review of the industrial policies 
and modes of organization that provide the historical 
background to each institutional environment (section 
II). It then focuses on the 1960s, exploring the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ in the first institutional wave of world 
culture (section III). Section IV reviews what has been 
called here the ‘military interlude’ as the basis for a 
better understanding of certain patterns of change in 
the 1990s. Section V analyses the 1990s and section 
VI, lastly, presents some conclusions.
The military interlude meant an interruption in the 
influence of certain international bodies, an influence 
that resumed in a context of market liberalization 
and the renewed sway of world culture. To make the 
comparison plainer, the same structure of analysis was 
followed for the 1960s and the 1990s.
I
Introduction
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The f irst effort at organization by Uruguayan 
industrialists came with the creation of the Industrial 
League in 1879 (Jacob, 1981). This was short-lived and 
faced hostility from supporters of free trade: agrarian 
landowners and the business elite in Montevideo. 
As the word ‘League’ suggests, this was a loose 
conglomeration of different groups of fairly weak 
associations. The debate about a new customs law was 
to trigger the establishment of the Uruguayan Industrial 
Union (UIU) in 1898 (Ferrando, 1989), mobilizing the 
old members of the League in defence of protectionist 
ideals. The industrial sector was coming up at this 
time owing to the growth of industrial activity and 
the increasing influence of José Batlle y Ordóñez 
and ‘Batllismo’.1 Most UIU members were owners 
of small workshops, since there were very few large 
manufacturing plants in the country. The ranks of 
the UIU did not include any of the country’s leading 
families, but different immigrant groups were strongly 
represented (Beretta Curi and Etcheverry, 1998). 
Another point that should be stressed is how little State 
involvement there was when industrialists began to 
organize. However, many of the association’s younger 
members went on to join the ranks of the country’s 
leading politicians. One example is Batlle y Ordóñez 
himself, who was a journalist in the Industrial League, 
and another was José Serrato, an engineer in the UIU.2 
Business leaders were included in the decision-making 
process as Batllism gained ground, and this gave rise 
to organizational changes designed to ensure effective 
business representation. Thus, in 1914 the Chamber 
of Industry of Uruguay was founded with the aim of 
creating a more centralized and efficient structure. The 
name UIU was retained, while some documents and 
statements were signed under the name of ‘Chamber 
of Industry of Uruguay, leading corporation of the 
Union of Industrialists of Uruguay’. Only in 1973 
was the Chamber of Industry of Uruguay appellation 
formalized as the organization’s sole name.
The situation in Chile was very different. By the 
late nineteenth century, the Pacific War had already 
generated strong State demand for heavy industry. 
Before the conflict, the Chilean manufacturing sector 
comprised a few isolated factories and a range of 
small workshops. With large mineral deposits secured, 
both mining and railway construction stimulated the 
establishment of heavy industries because of their 
growing requirements for locomotives and equipment 
(Kirsch, 1977). Chilean industry thus emerged in close 
association with the State, under tariff protection or 
direct government ownership. By contrast with the 
situation in Uruguay, there was active official support 
for the creation of the Manufacturers Association 
(SFF). The finance minister asked the National Society 
of Agriculture (SNA) to support the creation of an 
association that would represent the interests of Chilean 
manufacturers (Ceppi, Sanhueza and others, 1983). It 
was thus that the Manufacturers Association came to 
be created in 1883 under State auspices (Zeitlin, 1984) 
—a modest organization that had to hold its meetings 
on the premises of the SNA (Apey, 1988). The support 
of the SNA shows that, despite the growth of industry, 
there were no serious conflicts between rural and 
industrial interests.
The role of the SFF grew in importance when 
industrialization became a State policy, conducted 
through bodies such as the Production Development 
Corporation (CORFO), created in 1939. It is no 
coincidence that the initiative of creating the SFF was 
a ‘top-down’ one issuing from the State, and that 
the State also centralized industrial policies through 
CORFO, whose technical pre-eminence was respected 
and emulated by businesses. This can be seen as part 
and parcel of two characteristically Chilean institutions: 
elitism and meritocracy. Chile isolated itself from the 
civil wars of the Southern Cone, giving continuity and 
strength to a hierarchically structured State apparatus 
dominated by an oligarchy, to a meritocratic State 
bureaucracy and to a political class with an interest 
in a strong State.
The consolidation of the Uruguayan State, and of 
its oligarchy, came much later. This might explain why 
the CIU was a ‘bottom-up’ creation. Although it became 
institutionalized during the Batllista period, contacts 
II
Early industrial organization and policies
1 Batlle was President of Uruguay in 1903-1907 and 1911-1915.
2 Serrato was President of Uruguay in 1923-1927.
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1. Uruguay
During the first half of the twentieth century, the CIU 
turned itself into a solid and increasingly influential 
organization, a process that was associated with 
the rapid advance of industry and the strengthening 
of industrial groups. Approximately half of today’s 
Uruguayan industrial groups were formed between 
1933 and 1954 (Zurbriggen, 1999). In 1966, the 
CIU had a membership of some 20,000 companies 
with around 500,000 employees (El Día, 1966). The 
General Assembly was the most representative body, 
electing board members by means of lists rather than 
as individual candidates. A great many members 
came from sectoral industry associations, which were 
required to see that all their members were registered 
as members of the CIU, although this was not strictly 
enforced. The industry associations also had non-
voting representatives on the board. Furthermore, 
one criterion for selecting candidates was that they 
should represent people from different sectors with 
previous experience in an industry association. Each 
election replaced a third of board members, so that 
change was gradual. All this added up to a generally 
non-confrontational atmosphere, since the different 
industry associations (and the major companies) usually 
agreed upon a common list of candidates. This system 
assured stability in the running of the CIU whilst 
reducing internal debate and participation. Thus, the 
dominance of large firms gave the CIU the image of a 
‘big industrialists’ club’. At the 1966 General Assembly, 
just 49 companies participated in the election (CIU, 
1966). Besides the industry associations, the board had 
a great deal of influence, extended through the working 
committees. Committee chairmen were board members, 
but had to be approved by the General Assembly.
Most of the CIU annual report for 1966-1967 was 
given over to information about contacts with public 
authorities regarding customs matters or exchange 
rates (CIU, 1966). It is unsurprising, then, that the 
two national units most often mentioned were the 
Ministry of Industry and the (State-owned) Banco de la 
República Oriental del Uruguay. The CIU offered little 
in the way of services and did not pay much attention 
to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); this 
reinforced its image as an elitist organization and 
may have contributed to the low turnout in internal 
elections. As for the profile of board members, the 
annual report referred to above shows that about half 
had no academic qualifications (a profile similar to 
that of industry ministers at the time). Of those who 
did have such qualifications, most lacked any training 
in economics or technological disciplines. There was 
a retired general, a doctor and two lawyers. Two 
engineers and an accountant represented professions 
perhaps more allied with manufacturing. This lack of 
professionalism was a characteristic shared with the 
Uruguayan civil service (CIDE, 1989). The country had 
no training plan for officials, and when something along 
these lines was implemented, little account was taken of 
the private sector. Companies continued to be family-
owned (owners were usually first- or second-generation 
immigrants) and produced consumer goods for the local 
market. Although some had grown into oligopolies 
(with State protection), they had no incentive to change. 
Sons succeeded fathers with no change in management 
profiles, which is perhaps why most board members 
were owners rather than professional managers. Nor 
with the State were as fragmented as industrial policies, 
where these existed. Leaving aside Batlle’s towering 
presence, what Uruguay had were not ‘policies’ but 
‘shoves’ delivered by the leadership of the moment 
and personal networks. This is why caudillism and 
clientelism emerge as predominant institutions. The 
difference between caudillism (Uruguay) and elitism 
(Chile) is that while the former has more to do with 
‘charisma’, which operates horizontally across social 
groups, the latter is based on a more vertical structure 
in which a hierarchical order is segmented by way of 
dominant groups. None of this means that the salient 
features of one case are not to be found in the other; 
we are simply pointing out what appear to be the 
characteristics of each institutional environment.
III
The 1960s
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was there any interest in change: contacts with the 
State guaranteed business and the importance of the 
CIU was not at issue.
(a) The national level
Most CIU contacts were with the executive branch, 
and especially the industry ministry, which industrialists 
lobbied for various types of State intervention. The 
ministry had little in the way of industrial policies, 
however, and lacked the technical capabilities and 
powers of coordination to implement policies efficiently. 
If professional training is taken as an indicator of 
‘technical capacity’, the backgrounds of ministers are 
revealing. Between 1907 and 1996 there were just one 
economist, five accountants and four engineers; the rest 
were lawyers or people without academic qualifications 
(MIEM, 1997). Few came from the private sector. The 
profile of ministers suggests that party affiliation 
outweighed technical capabilities. Another important 
body in the State was the Banco de la República 
Oriental del Uruguay, which had the monopoly of the 
currency market and controlled the country’s system 
of differentiated exchange rates. A key division in the 
bank was the Auditing Unit for Currency Operations 
and Capital Transfers Abroad. Although the position 
of the bank declined with the liberal reforms of the 
early 1960s, it was still playing an important role in 
the middle of the decade.
Other points of intersection between industrialists 
and the State were the different committees that acted 
as meeting places between the public and private 
sectors. Although these were not often mentioned in 
CIU reports, their activities may serve to show the areas 
in which businesses exercised influence. Two examples 
are the Rebate Advisory Committee and the Tariff 
Board. Although the CIU had little influence on policy-
making, it had a great deal to say about rebates and 
import tariffs. One particularly interesting aspect of the 
interaction with the State was the Uruguayan version 
of developmentalism, promoted by the Investment and 
Economic Development Committee (CIDE) created 
in January 1960. This committee had high-grade 
technical staff and its work had an effect on industry. 
Contrary to the usual perception of industrialists 
as ‘clientelist’ or ‘short-termist’, there were serious 
efforts by the sector to offer proposals of its own that 
would harmonize with the work of the CIDE. The most 
important of these was the creation of the Coordinating 
Committee for Economic Development (COMCORDE) 
in 1963. Widespread support for the creation of the 
CIDE was a fundamental source of inspiration for 
COMCORDE members.3 Approximately 50 technical 
specialists passed through this coordinating committee, 
one of the first organizations in the country to recruit 
economists. From the dissolution of the CIDE in 1967 
to its own closure in 1981, COMCORDE produced 
a series of indicative planning studies and sectoral 
analyses. Because the CIDE was a modernizing venture 
with a wide-ranging long-term vision, the CIU firmly 
supported it. It is also clear, though, that the CIDE 
was very dependent on the State. When the latter lost 
interest in developmentalism, businesses were unable 
to sustain the new approach and went back to their 
old ways.
(b) The regional and global level
Most references to non-Uruguayan bodies in the 
1966-1967 annual report concern regional organizations, 
especially the Latin American Free Trade Association 
(LAFTA), created in 1961. Businesses were initially 
somewhat apathetic about this initiative, in which they 
participated at the behest of the government rather than 
on their own initiative (Finch, 1973). Nor were official 
efforts to engage the private sector very enthusiastic. 
As for the CIU, Astori (1980) argues that the Chamber 
perceived the free trade area more as a threat to 
Uruguay’s protectionist system than as a change in 
the international context that would help increase 
industrial exports. Unsurprisingly, then, the Chamber 
did not participate in the preparatory committees for the 
LAFTA agreement. By 1966 the Chamber’s scepticism 
had abated markedly: it was argued that LAFTA was of 
critical importance for Uruguay and that more attention 
had to be paid to the subject of integration and the 
adoption of a long-term policy. Apart from the trade 
aspect, industrialists were interested in the new types of 
international business networks that developed around 
the negotiations: for example, the Association of Latin 
American Industrialists (AILA). Regional bodies of 
this type did much to promote new kinds of business 
identity that played a key role in the adoption of a 
positive stance towards LAFTA.
Despite the changing attitude of the CIU towards 
integration, its organizational structure did not alter 
much4 and LAFTA hardly rated a mention in the 1966-
1967 annual report, perhaps because the CIU never 
3 Interview with Walter Luciardo Aznares, technical secretary of 
the CIU in 1966.
4 Interview with Carlos Folle, head of the CIU in 1966.
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explicitly adopted a pro-export outlook. Only in the 
mid-1970s was an external trade committee created in 
the CIU, with much internal discussion of the progress 
made by sectoral meetings, supplementary agreements 
and regional programmes for businesses. Although the 
CIU had a low profile in the LAFTA process, sectoral 
industry associations and large companies were more 
active. Because the State did not have the tools it 
needed to obtain the requisite information, businesses 
played a key role in the preference or concession issues 
negotiated by Uruguay with other countries. Requests 
for information were routed through the CIU or directly 
through sectoral associations. From this point of view, 
it would be true to say that they exercised influence. 
Another part of the LAFTA process related to the work 
of the Association of Latin American Industrialists 
(AILA). Having been fairly enthusiastic to begin with, 
in 1966 the CIU turned sceptical, arguing that AILA 
tended to be over-bureaucratic and that its members 
did not have the financial capacity to make it work 
(La Mañana, 1966).
The CIU 1966-1967 annual report mentions just two 
international forums (the World Wool Congress and the 
International Labour Conference) in a way that indicates 
some kind of engagement. There are also two mentions 
of the Uruguayan Technical Standards Institute (UNIT), 
founded in 1939. Although this was a Uruguayan body 
(private but State-backed), it quickly began to act as a 
representative of international institutions in its work 
with quality standards. Businesses had little interest in 
quality improvements, so UNIT was barely mentioned. It 
is interesting to note that the international organization 
that was perhaps most important to the industrial 
sector, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 
was not mentioned in this annual report. This may 
be due to the lack of formal contact between the CIU 
and the IDB, which essentially operated through the 
State and, most particularly, the Banco de la República 
Oriental del Uruguay. On the whole, there was little 
that the CIU might have written about regional or global 
organizations in that period.
2. Chile
The technical profile of SFF executive committee 
members gives a good idea of the difference between 
the institutional settings of Chile and Uruguay. Most 
were professionals, invariably engineers. Foreign 
qualifications do not seem to have been common in 
Chile either: just one committee member held them. 
Most of the members held positions in the State 
apparatus, examples being the SFF representatives 
on the boards of CORFO and the Central Bank of 
Chile. Something the SFF had in common with the 
CIU was that the members of its executive committee 
came essentially from large firms. On the other hand, 
managers were better represented on the SFF board, 
perhaps because Chile had a more highly developed 
industrial sector where professional managers (as 
opposed to traditional owners) were more likely to 
represent firms. The strong presence of large companies 
(represented by owners or managers) in the SFF 
leadership heightened the organization’s image as a 
representative of business groups. What Arriagada 
(1970) called the “oligarchic tendency” was entrenched 
by statutes that did not allow voting by lists, thus 
preventing the creation of electoral groups. At the same 
time, industry associations had one vote each on the 
executive committee, which did not reflect their true 
weight in the SFF. For example, the Association of 
Metallurgical and Mechanical Engineering Industries 
(ASIMET), representing 17.5% of members, had just one 
seat on the committee. Furthermore, 28% of executive 
committee members were honorary and former 
chairmen had a seat for life. According to Arriagada 
(1970), these elements combined to favour oligarchic 
tendencies that benefited large industrial groups.
(a) The national level
Although LAFTA was the organization that received 
the most mentions in the SFF 1966-1967 annual report 
(SFF, 1966), most of the association’s contacts were 
with local organizations as a group, and particularly 
State ones, especially CORFO, the Central Bank and 
parliament. In relation to CORFO, this annual report 
refers to contacts in which the SFF called for lower tariffs 
on imports of industrial equipment. Another reference 
is to complaints by regional industry associations about 
difficulties with credits and debt repayments. These 
representations were made to the SFF leadership and 
then relayed directly to CORFO. Regarding the Central 
Bank, import quotas were an important concern. This 
also came up in the debate on an export promotion law. 
As for interaction with parliament, to which it gave 
higher priority than the CIU, the SFF had an advisory 
group on parliamentary matters which members could 
approach for advice and contacts with politicians. SFF 
(1966) shows that the association expressed its views on 
amendments to the law giving special tariff treatment to 
the Department of Arica. Parliament was also mentioned 
in connection with the law to promote the automobile 
industry in Chile and constitutional amendments to 
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“weaken effective private property rights”. This was 
partially related to an outspoken debate on agrarian 
reform.
Regarding participation on State committees, the 
SFF, like the CIU, had an institutionalized role in the 
import substitution structure. It was represented on 
State bodies such as the Banco del Estado, CORFO and 
the General Board of Customs, where business leaders 
concerned themselves mainly with specific issues such 
as prices, exchange controls or specific laws. Beyond 
this involvement, industrialists did not appear to have 
any particular stance of their own on the economy. Each 
was basically concerned with its own sector, leaving 
the initiative of producing economic and social policies 
to the State. This did not mean that they did not try 
to create their own analytical instruments. In 1954, 
a group of businesses founded the Chilean Institute 
of Rational Business Management (ICARE). Those 
behind the initiative saw themselves as ‘progressive 
employers’ and most of their leaders were from the 
SFF (Empresa, 1968). At the same time as ICARE was 
showing it had the initiative to create research centres 
of its own, there were signs of close interaction with 
the State. Very well-known officials and supporters 
of the Christian Democratic Party, such as Raúl Sáez 
and Gabriel Valdés, became presidents of the institute. 
Until 1968, almost all ICARE chairmen had held public 
office, most as ministers or ambassadors.
(b) The regional and global level
As in the case of the CIU, the international 
body most often mentioned in the SFF 1966-1967 
annual report was regional in character: LAFTA. The 
participation of the SFF in the LAFTA system was 
also similar to that of the CIU: both gave or withheld 
their approval to negotiated products. In the Chilean 
case, it is surprising that LAFTA was mentioned more 
often than CORFO, since industrialists were not export-
oriented. One reason could be that Chile was among 
the most active countries in the integration debate. It is 
no coincidence that the headquarters of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA)5 was located 
in Santiago, the Chilean capital, or that several of that 
organization’s great thinkers were Chilean. Industrialists 
were also enthusiastic about ECLA initiatives, as 
was LAFTA. In 1961, at the annual meeting of the 
SFF National Industry Convention, firm support was 
expressed for the integration process and the decision 
was taken to create a free trade committee in the SFF, 
whose work would be coordinated jointly with the 
government. Opinion was not unanimous, however, as 
companies in the light industry segment (comprising 
most of Uruguayan industry) rather tended to oppose 
the idea from fear of regional competition (Mikesell, 
1961). Despite this, the SFF was one of the driving 
forces behind LAFTA. This perhaps ties in with its 
image as an elite organization, although many of the 
enthusiasts were also jealous of their tariff protections. 
LAFTA had another dimension that transcended 
economic calculations.
Businesses were highly dependent on a State that 
was making major advances in the industrial sector. 
This was viewed with suspicion by the SFF leadership, 
whose position was weakening owing to the successes 
of CORFO and its ‘public-sector entrepreneurs’. In this 
context, the declarations made in support of the private 
sector by regional integration organizations and their 
associated business networks acted as a counterweight 
to growing ‘statism’. The strategy of Chilean business 
leaders was to pursue ideological strength and legitimacy 
through these organizations, in order to promote the 
idea that Chile needed the private sector. Perhaps this 
is why the SFF showed itself more favourable to AILA 
than the CIU; even as the CIU was criticizing AILA as a 
bureaucratic and unnecessary organization, the SFF was 
making more positive statements in support of a higher 
level of institutionalized private-sector involvement in 
the negotiations. The IDB, under the leadership of a 
Chilean, Felipe Herrera, provided Chile with a great 
deal of support but had little contact with the SFF. The 
SFF 1966-1967 annual report tells of the donation of a 
valuable economics library to the SFF by the IDB and 
describes the participation of members of the Chilean 
business community in a conference on regional 
integration financed by the bank. The SFF seems to have 
had rather more contact with the IDB than did the CIU, 
but this should not be put down exclusively to a specific 
outlook among businesses. In fact, most regional and 
global contacts were handled by the State. As early as 
the 1950s it began to send officials to study abroad and 
strengthened ties with universities in the United States 
and Europe. Meanwhile, Chile was very popular with 
international organizations, receiving more support 
than any other country in terms of dollars per capita 
(El Mercurio, 1966). A major impetus was provided 
here by the interaction with ECLA, the international 
body most influential in spreading the technocratic 
5 Now the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC).
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The coup in Uruguay was launched by a constitutional 
president with military support, so that there was 
continuity in economic policies and leadership. As 
Faroppa (1982) explains, the bases of the model 
from 1973 onward were the same as those adopted 
shortly before by the civilian government, i.e., the 
1973-1977 National Development Plan, produced by 
the Office of Planning and the Budget. The regime’s 
economy minister himself, Alejandro Vegh Villegas, has 
explained that when he took up the position he based 
his actions on the plan prepared by Ricardo Zerbino 
and Alberto Bensión.6 Both Zerbino and Bensión later 
became ministers in post-dictatorship governments, 
so that it is reasonable to speak of continuity in 
economic policy design. Two of the main initiatives 
of Vegh’s ministry had already been signed when he 
came to power: the Argentine-Uruguayan Economic 
Co-operation Agreement (CAUCE) and the Protocol on 
the Expansion of Trade between Uruguay and Brazil 
(PEC). These agreements were very important for the 
manufacturing sector, and the CIU in particular, as it 
acquired an institutionalized position in the new trading 
system with a monopoly on the issue of certificates of 
origin for exports under CAUCE and PEC, thus obtaining 
a new and very substantial source of revenue.
When the army seized power in Chile, the State 
controlled almost the whole of the banking system, 
over 323 firms had been confiscated or were under 
State supervision, and large tracts of land were being 
administered by cooperatives. During 1972, exports 
fell to their lowest level yet, inflation reached 600% 
and export revenues were 80% dependent on copper. 
Private-sector associations saw themselves as part of 
the driving force behind a victorious revolution and the 
new regime (Campero, 1984). They continued to give 
their support even though they were soon pushed to 
the sidelines by what Silva (1996) called the “radical 
neoliberal coalition”, and even when sharp tariff cuts 
forced large sectors of industry into bankruptcy. The 
severe economic crisis of 1982 finally removed this 
tendency, which was replaced by a pragmatic neoliberal 
group in which business had a greater voice. After 
their testing experiences with both the Popular Unity 
government and the ‘Chicago boys’, businesses began 
to develop their own technical capabilities, acquiring a 
shared language with the State technocracy.
In Uruguay, meanwhile, certain traditional 
features remained. After more than a decade of 
military government, economic policies culminated in 
an instrument designed to create a base of clientelist 
support for the men of the dictatorship (Stolovich, 
Rodríguez and Bértola, 1996). Owing to the structure 
of the military junta itself, and by contrast with 
Pinochet’s centralism, each section of the armed 
forces had a significant power of veto, which created 
opportunities for establishing pressure groups and 
reduced the influence of State experts on public 
policy implementation. The military did not succeed 
in consolidating caudillo figures. What they did was 
to create sectoral leaderships that interfered with 
the operation of centralizing mechanisms and led to 
clientelism. Changes were few, among industrialists 
as elsewhere.
approach in government and business circles through 
indicative planning. The ingredients of the first wave 




6 Interview with Alejandro Vegh Villegas, Minister of Economy in 
1974-1976 and 1983-1985.
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1. Chile
The environment was the subject treated at greatest 
length in the SFF 1998-1999 annual report. This was 
an issue that was almost non-existent in the 1960s 
and that began to be taken seriously in 1992, with the 
appearance of the first State environmental programme, 
the Metropolitan Region Decontamination Plan. A 
few years later there were 10 national programmes. 
Although the environment became a very important 
issue for industrialists, it only occupied a small 
portion of SFF manpower. One reason for this was 
the substantial technical support provided by member 
firms. The task of the SFF, therefore, was mainly 
to monitor the legislative process through special 
committees in which company experts participated.7 
A second issue addressed in this annual report was 
that of international relations and foreign trade. The 
issue of foreign trade gained in importance, it might 
be said, in two ways: through participation in trade 
negotiations and through the work done with trade 
promotion organizations (services). The SFF became the 
‘technical secretariat’ for the private sector where trade 
negotiations were concerned.8 A third set of issues was 
dealt with by the social development section, which did 
not exist in 1966; the most important of these derived 
from the association’s traditional commitments, such as 
industrial education. By 1998, the SFF was running 18 
technical secondary schools nationwide and had become 
one of the country’s intermediate technical training 
organizations (OTIC) by virtue of a State programme 
run by the National Training and Employment Service 
(SENCE). The 1997-1998 annual report also refers to the 
Small Business Development Corporation (PROPESA), 
which provided small enterprises with soft loans and 
ran educational programmes with the help of resources 
from the Solidarity and Social Investment Fund (FOSIS), 
allocated by CORFO.
The composition of the 1998 executive committee, 
as compared with that of 1966, evinces two tendencies: 
greater professionalization and concentration in 
economic areas. In 1998, 85% of the committee was 
composed of professionals, as against 64% in 1966. 
Most of them were engineers or what in Chile are 
called commercial engineers. In 1998 there were also 
more foreign-educated members, almost all of them 
graduates of universities in the United States. Between 
1966 and 1998, the proportion of managers on the 
committee rose from 63% to 70%, while the share of 
members holding public office fell from 55% to 30%. 
Another characteristic was that more members had 
ties to companies belonging to the major industrial 
groups.
(a) The national level
The organization most often mentioned in 
the SFF 1997-1998 annual report was the National 
Environment Commission (CONAMA). Another public 
body mentioned in connection with environmental issues 
was the Metropolitan Environmental Health Service 
(SESMA), which was responsible for implementing the 
Metropolitan Region Decontamination Plan. This was a 
matter of the greatest importance for businesses, as the 
emissions of a number of firms were to be monitored 
by public bodies. The role of SESMA was rather reactive 
in nature, since CONAMA was the driving force behind 
the new regulations.
As regards foreign trade, there was an explosion 
of services provided mainly by the Chilean State, 
which had improved its coordination mechanisms both 
internally (Interministerial Committee for International 
Economic Negotiations) and externally with the private 
sector (Private Sector Participation Committee). A key 
organization was the Office of International Economic 
Affairs (DIRECON), which came under the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. As Silva (2001) explains, the 
relationship between DIRECON and the SFF became 
a key link in public-private interaction, as they were 
both coordination units in their respective areas. 
Another State UNIT with close links to the SFF was 
the Export Promotion Bureau, known as ProChile, 
which helped Chilean businesses enter international 
markets. Although CORFO is hardly mentioned in the 
1997-1998 annual report, many of the governmental 
or paragovernmental bodies appearing there were 
V
The 1990s
7 Interview with Aníbal Mege Thierry, head of the SFF environmental 
section.
8 Interview with Aníbal Mege Thierry.
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part of the network financed by CORFO. During the 
first half of the 1990s, the total amount of resources 
transferred through public financing instruments could 
be put at some US$ 470 million (Muñoz, 1997, p. 8). 
Although public assistance programmes were criticized 
for being slow or inefficient, they were not spurned 
by the representatives of the SFF, which indeed had 
benefited financially from the system. The position 
of the SFF is reminiscent in a way of that attending 
the creation of CORFO, when it was accepted that the 
State should take responsibility for a large proportion 
of business development policies, trusting that this 
would not undermine private property rights. Mutual 
understanding with the State could also be seen in 
the increasingly technocratic nature of both the public 
and the private sectors. Almost all CORFO programme 
directors were economists, many of them graduates of 
United States universities. The same was true of high-
level executives in the private sector. On the whole, there 
was a somewhat ‘promiscuous’ relationship between the 
public and private sectors. SFF participation in these 
service structures seems to have fallen off towards 
the late 1990s, however. In place of the SFF, the main 
interlocutor for CORFO and the industrial sector came 
to be a sectoral association of the SFF, the Association 
of Exporters of Manufactures (ASEXMA).
(b) The regional and global level
The non-Uruguayan organization most often 
mentioned in the SFF 1997-1998 annual report was 
MERCOSUR (it ranked fifth overall). This is rather 
different to the situation with LAFTA in 1966. When 
the references are compared between the two periods, 
other interesting differences emerge. In the 1990s, 
patterns of interaction between the SFF and the regional 
and global levels were not really directed at individual 
organizations so much as at free trade negotiations 
and treaties, a reflection perhaps of the fact that Chile 
had the most trade agreements of any country in Latin 
America, and that businesses were increasingly export-
oriented. The space given over to trade (including 
MERCOSUR) in the annual report cited does not reflect 
the huge impact of this issue on the structure of the 
SFF. In the 1960s, the SFF acted as a ‘messenger’ in 
the negotiations: it was given the lists of topics to be 
negotiated, delivered them to the companies concerned 
and then relayed their responses to the government.9 
In the 1990s, the negotiating format was far more 
complex: not only were almost all the issues on the 
table at once, but negotiations were going on with 
several different countries at the same time. This led 
to the creation of a whole new system of interaction 
with the State, one of the precedents for which was the 
1997 partnership treaty with MERCOSUR containing 
timetables for tariff reductions across the board. 
Perceiving that an agreement with MERCOSUR was of 
strategic value, the SFF gave its technical and political 
support. The partnership negotiated by Chile with 
MERCOSUR also transcended commercial calculation. 
Business representatives and State technocrats 
worked closely together on the complex negotiations. 
Another important if less crucial aspect was growing 
collaboration among the region’s firms by virtue of 
their participation in private-sector organizations or 
networks, usually centring on trade agreements or 
negotiations; these included the MERCOSUR Industrial 
Council and the Business Network for Hemispheric 
Integration (REIH). The growing interest in external 
trade led to the creation of new working groups in 
the SFF, and to the incorporation of a large network 
of company consultants and specialists.
Where services are concerned, there is a striking 
lack of references to external cooperation agencies in 
SFF documents. Although many were highly active 
in this field, they go virtually unmentioned. On the 
whole, the SFF showed a certain reluctance to become 
involved with them. It argued, for example, that it did 
not need funding from these organizations because it 
was operating as a private business, competing in the 
marketplace (largely with State financing). It is true 
that it had had little involvement with international 
agencies in the 1960s, but it is surprising that this 
situation should have continued as these organizations 
became increasingly active locally. Thus, for example, 
GTZ (German Agency for Technical Cooperation),10 
one of the most influential development agencies in 
Chile, which specialized in assisting SMEs, acted not 
through the SFF but through ASEXMA. The SFF was 
considered to have a rather authoritarian conception 
of social relations and was seen as a defender of 
large companies, with little representation among 
SMEs. Representatives of two organizations that were 
important in the field of business services thought 
9 Interview with Hugo Baierlein Hermida, SFF external trade 
director. 10 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit.
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much the same: Eurocentro (financed by the European 
Union) and the IDB.11
One of the elements that most conflicted with 
world culture came to light during Augusto Pinochet’s 
trial in the United Kingdom. As Tironi (1999, p. 59) 
points out, Pinochet’s detention made many Chilean 
business leaders realize that globalization, formerly 
so idealized, could become a threat, and they quickly 
began to demonize it. Furthermore, Pinochet’s detention 
showed that Chile was involved with the world not 
just economically but morally, politically and legally 
as well.
2. Uruguay
A comparison of the CIU organization chart of 1998 
with that of 1966 shows that most of the committees 
operating in the 1960s had kept their names. However, 
some new issues had come to prominence, among them 
foreign trade. Although a Free Trade Area Advisory 
Commission already existed in 1966, it concerned itself 
almost exclusively with LAFTA. In 1998, by contrast, 
the External Trade Committee was considered to be of 
crucial importance for the sector, had a much wider 
range of activities and easily attracted the largest 
number of participants of any committee (35, against 
an average of 15). The Environment Committee, 
which was also new, was much less active, perhaps 
because the State had done very little work in this 
area, for which its Technical Advisory Committee on 
Environmental Protection (COTAMA) was responsible. 
Another committee that had not existed in the 1960s 
was the one responsible for relations with the ‘interior’ 
(the rest of the country outside the Montevideo area). 
To be represented nationwide was always a goal 
of the Chamber and one which has not yet been 
achieved, even though Uruguay is a relatively small 
country. Among the committees surviving from the 
1960s was one concerned with science, technology 
and quality, perhaps because these issues, along with 
foreign trade, attracted a particularly large volume of 
services and support from international organizations. 
The Economic Affairs and Investment Unit also had 
a long track record. Apart from what COMCORDE had 
done, the CIU did not have much research of its own. 
The 1990s brought a renewed interest in this type of 
activity, but the studies carried out were not focused 
on long-term policies, generally dealing instead with 
periodic indicators. Lastly, the Social and Employment 
Relations Committee also existed in 1966, but this was 
not a very active area for the CIU.
In 1998, the board of the Chamber included 
only a small number of professionals, something that 
did not sit well with its new service-oriented profile 
and indeed marked a change from its composition 
in 1966, when there were more professionals (CIU, 
1998). Another interesting point is that in 1998, none 
of the board seems to have held public office. This 
was also a change from 1966, when at least two held 
government positions. In the two years considered, no 
board member had a foreign degree. If board members 
are assumed to be representative of the leading group 
of industrialists, it has to be said that their professional 
profile was weak, whether compared to the 1960s or 
to the SFF. In the latter, not only did the number of 
professionals and managers increase, but so did the 
number of qualifications obtained abroad. In addition 
to having a weak professional profile, the membership 
of the CIU board was still constituted mainly by owners 
(of companies with little international exposure) 
rather than professional managers. It would seem that 
despite efforts at liberal reform, the new generation 
of Uruguayan business leaders still came from an 
institutional environment in which the premium was 
on social skills more than professional ones. This 
characteristic was mentioned in an ECLAC study, which 
argued that in Uruguay most contacts were initiated 
individually, highlighting the importance of relying 
on personal networks rather than on those backed by 
the State or any other organization (ECLAC, 1998). 
However, the profound impact of the crises and of 
trade liberalization on industry caused many large 
companies to disappear. Consequently, SMEs were 
better represented on the 1998 board, and this may 
have been an incentive for change. A sign of this was 
the election of new authorities in 1992, when several 
candidate lists were presented for the first time in 20 
years. According to Zurbriggen (1999), almost 50% 
of members participated in the election, an enormous 
increase on the 3% (about 50 members) that normally 
voted. New actors entered the scene.
(a) The national level
One of the national organizations most often 
mentioned in the CIU 1998-1999 annual report was 
11 Interviews with Francesca Di Micco, in charge of the Eurocentro 
project; Vladimir Radovic, IDB representative in Chile; and Peter 
Palesch, director of the GTZ agency in Chile and coordinator for 
the whole of MERCOSUR.
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the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining (MIEM), 
although tariff and subsidy reductions meant that this 
was no longer the ‘pressure point’ it had formerly 
been. The reforms of the 1990s assigned this ministry 
the role of service coordinator and promoter of SME 
support programmes. Nonetheless, a signif icant 
proportion of companies did not see any advantage to 
participating in programmes related to the creation of 
export consortia or networks of different kinds, fearing 
excessive bureaucratization (ECLAC, 1998). Some went 
further and complained of  “the Ministry’s poor image”. 
Another criticism, echoing Esser, Almer and others 
(1983), was of a lack of direction in competitiveness 
policies. There were even some who argued that “MIEM 
has no real existence”, as it was only part of a clientelist 
party agreement: if a government of the white party 
was in power, the ministry would belong to the red 
party, and vice versa.
Another organization that was often mentioned 
was the Technological Laboratory of Uruguay (LATU). 
This was the country’s leading technology laboratory, 
holding International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) certification and acting in turn as a certification 
body for ISO standards. It was associated with quality 
and new technologies, thereby helping to give the CIU 
a ‘modern’ image. Among the organizations working 
with LATU were the Technological Management Centre 
(CEGETEC) and the National Business Support Service 
(SENAE), whose main mission was to provide smes 
with technical assistance and project implementation 
guidance. The third most frequently cited Uruguayan 
organization was parliament. As we saw earlier, the 
CIU had created a committee to deal with legislative 
issues. According to business people, parliament was 
generally ill-informed about the industrial sector and 
there were virtually no institutionalized channels for 
exchanging views. This committee sought to monitor 
legal issues relating to the sector and help CIU member 
associations present their positions or alternative 
proposals to parliamentarians.
(b) The regional and global level
Although the CIU 1966-1967 annual report 
made more mention of local organizations than of 
international or regional ones, the latter gained greatly 
in prominence over the 1966-1998 period. Among 
non-Uruguayan organizations (and indeed in total), 
the most frequent mentions were of MERCOSUR. 
However, Uruguayan business leaders did not show 
much interest in participating in the integration process 
(Birle, Imbusch and Wagner, 1994). It is true that the 
CIU was quick to accept MERCOSUR, but this owed 
more to a feeling that there was no alternative than 
to a true regionalist spirit or export ambitions. When 
companies, after decades of protection, grasped the 
harsh realities of lower tariffs, the Chamber’s optimism 
gave way to qualified support. Liberalization increased 
the vulnerability of Uruguayan industry and reduced 
the Chamber’s revenues, since fewer certificates of 
origin were issued. One channel of participation in the 
process was the Sectoral Commission for MERCOSUR 
(COMISEC). Outside the State arena, there was also the 
MERCOSUR Industrial Council (CIM), which provided 
the Chamber with an international outlet for its views. 
Other than this, the State played a more preponderant 
role in the new trade negotiating format than it had 
in the 1960s.
Although MERCOSUR had a powerful impact on 
Uruguayan industrial structures, some international 
bodies influenced the organizational structure of the 
CIU and were crucial to its transformation into a 
service provider in the early 1990s. The ‘trigger’ for 
this was a project financed by the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in 1992, 
which led on to an IDB-financed project to study trade 
opportunities in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.12 This 
project left the CIU with two units supported by IDB 
funding: the Business Information Service (SIPE) 
and a training UNIT called the Industrial Institute for 
Higher Studies (IIES). The IDB became one of the 
CIU’s leading sources of support, going on to finance 
technical assistance and consultancy services for 
project implementation (CEGETEC) and the formation 
of ‘export consortia’. The tie-up with the IDB also 
operated on other levels, as a number of executives 
(technical experts) working in the CIU were in receipt 
of direct or indirect financing from the bank. IDB 
support did not come all at once, however. In view 
of the Chamber’s weaknesses as a service provider, 
IDB programmes included an ‘institution-building’ 
item intended to improve the technical capacity of the 
CIU. Another institution that also targeted businesses 
with SME programmes in Uruguay was GTZ. Its first 
project with the CIU began in the early 1990s with 
the establishment of an SME support division. Like 
the IDB, GTZ included ‘institutional support’ in its 
projects, something that was of a piece with its policy 
12 Interview with Roberto Villamil, general manager of the CIU.
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This study has examined the process of institutional 
change in Chile and Uruguay as experienced through 
industrialists’ associations. The hypothesis put forward 
here concerning an increase in the influence of 
global institutions and organizations in the 1990s 
has been confirmed. In the 1960s, world culture was 
already establishing a presence through international 
organizations that spread organizational models based 
on a rational culture. Support for ‘planning’ was 
associated in Chile and Uruguay with the promotion 
of a positive view of technical disciplines, the State 
and democracy. This outlook was embodied in 
developmentalism and ECLA, also strong promoters of 
regionalism, and had great influence on industrialists, 
especially in Chile. During the military interlude, the 
role of the State, democratic values and regionalism 
went into abeyance. The process of institutional 
change through market reforms continued, however, 
particularly in Chile. In the 1990s, with democracy 
re-established in both countries, there was a new 
influx of world culture in which international bodies 
had a stronger presence, the core issues now being 
external trade and competitiveness. This highlighted the 
importance of regionalism, whose main manifestation 
was MERCOSUR. In both countries, there were also 
changes in methods of interaction with the State, the 
most important player at the national level. Interaction 
of a subordinate, corporative nature gave way to a 
relationship based increasingly on services. These 
are the similarities, which are largely attributable to 
systemic changes.
The differences, for their part, have much to do 
with institutional peculiarities rooted in each local 
institutional environment. ‘Clientelism’ and ‘caudillism’ 
predominate in Uruguay, something that is associated 
with a permanent fragmentation of public policies and 
dependence on individual initiatives dominated by only 
loosely coordinated networks. This might explain the 
weak position of technical specialists and centralizing 
agents, ultimately resulting in a weak position for 
the State. Although the State remains very important 
for industrialists, its presence has diminished. This 
has opened the way to a larger role for international 
organizations and the “NGO-ization” of the CIU. In 
Chile, the technocratic approach has been maintained 
and strengthened, providing the basis for an elitism 
which has created points of contact between the SFF 
and the State. This is of a piece with the traditional 
tendency towards centralization via a ‘big State’ or a 
‘strong State’.
The present study shows that, for all their 
increasingly liberal rhetoric, Chilean business leaders 
have been resuming their close ties with the State, 
except that there has been a change in their substance. 
of turning industry associations into service-oriented 
organizations.13
In Uruguay, as in Chile, the European Union had 
development networks and programmes. One of them, 
in which the CIU (unlike the SFF in Chile) played an 
important role, was the Eurocentro, which was established 
within the Chamber itself and actively fostered trading 
ties between Uruguay and the European Union. In this 
way, the CIU also developed links to the Technological 
Information Promotion System (TIPS), associated 
with the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), and to the Development Information Network 
(DEVNET), and became the official representative for 
the ‘REFA methodology’, among other things. This 
started with a GTZ-financed project whereby REFA 
International14 helped to organize the CIU educational 
division. The appearance of the Chamber’s corridors 
was very different in 1998 to that of 1966. Many office 
doors bore the name of an international organization or 
an externally funded project. This meant not just new 
sources of financing, but greater influence for non-
Uruguayan sources of legitimation.
VI
Conclusions
13 Interview with Alfredo Echegaray, IDB sector specialist in 
Uruguay.
14 REFA International is a German federal association for business 
organization and training.
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Regarding the relationship between Chile and the 
world, we would say that its position as a ‘model 
country’ is nothing new, since it already had a great 
affinity to world culture in the 1990s. It would be a 
mistake to conclude that Chile was wholly attuned 
to ‘appropriateness’, however. There are elements 
of confrontation with world cultural values, forcing 
the SFF to grapple with less hierarchical and elitist 
conceptions of society; this may be the reason for its 
limited contact with international organizations, which 
are viewed with some suspicion. The reaction of the SFF 
to the Pinochet issue is also part of that confrontation. 
Oddly enough, this is leading it to strengthen its ties 
with the State, which is seen as an ‘ally’ when dealing 
with the economic and cultural aspects of globalization. 
In this respect, the Uruguayans are at an advantage. 
‘Caudillism’ and ‘clientelism’ bring a horizontality that 
fits better with ideas of what is ‘appropriate’ in global 
culture. They provide other possibilities for interaction 
between individuals and elites, both for citizens (in 
relation to the State) and in the private sector. It is 
not for nothing that when countries are ranked for 
their democratic character, Uruguay continues to 
come out near the top. In summary, if world culture is 
accepted as an ideal type, it might be said that Chile 
has a technocratic advantage over Uruguay, but that 
its elitism is a disadvantage. Uruguay, with its more 
horizontal, democratic culture, is still better placed 
in this respect, although it must be said that Chile is 
quickly closing the gap.
(Original: Spanish)
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